Abstract: Over the last decade, donors of foreign aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has raised concerns about the alignment of trust funds with the allocation of aid by the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessional lending arm, and begs the question of a distinct role of this new aid channel. We find that the cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid are poverty and policy selective. In this respect, they are much more similar to allocations from IDA than from bilateral aid. The allocations of trust fund types that are more closely controlled by donor countries -recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds -are more strongly related to the strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are poverty and policy selective across countries, while environmental trust funds respond neither to poverty nor the quality of environmental policies.
Introduction
Multilateral trust funds at the World Bank and at other international organizations are increasingly popular with donors of foreign aid. These new funding modalities allow donor governments to cooperate with like-minded donors only, and to earmark their aid for specific countries, sectors or objectives (as with other bilateral aid), while using the financial and implementation infrastructure of the multilateral organization hosting them. 1 The increasing importance of this "multi-bi" aid channel raises questions about its distinctiveness in relation to unearmarked multilateral aid and other bilateral aid, particularly with respect to country allocation patterns. Trust funds could potentially undermine the policy-and poverty-selectivity of the World Bank's IDA (International Development Association) aid, if donors' earmarked contributions come partly at the expense of their core contributions to IDA, and if trust fund allocations are not sensitive to recipients' quality of governance or income levels.
In this paper, we exploit a novel and rich dataset on World Bank trust fund disbursements from 2002 to 2012 to analyze the determinants of trust fund allocations across countries, differentiating trust funds by type and sector. We specifically compare the policy-and povertyselectivity of multi-bi aid to that of other bilateral aid and of the World Bank's IDA disbursements.
We find that trust funds are similar to IDA, and different from other bilateral aid, in being highly sensitive to recipient's income and quality of governance. Multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank thus do not appear to undermine IDA's allocation criteria, even if donors' contributions to them partially crowd out their IDA contributions. We leave for future research the question of whether the increase in trust funds has had an impact on core contributions to IDA 2 , their potential effects on other aspects of World Bank operational policies, 3 and the effectiveness of trust funds relative to traditional bilateral and multilateral core aid.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information on World Bank trust funds and reviews related literature. Section 3 presents some theoretical arguments concerning donor motives on allocation of trust funds. Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 discusses the methods and presents the main results for aggregate and sector-specific disbursements. Section 6 concludes.
Background and Related Literature
1 Because trust fund contributions are earmarked, they are officially classified by the OECD DAC as bilateral aid, although multilaterals are the implementing agencies. 2 Eichenauer and Hug (2014) propose a model with a multilateral agent governed by multiple principals with heterogeneous preferences to better understand the tradeoffs donors face when choosing bilateral, multilateral or trust fund aid. Assuming a fixed aid budget, their findings suggest that the possibility of trust fund contributions decreases bilateral and multilateral 'core' aid in most cases. During IDA replenishment negotiations, the World Bank sometimes places a moratorium on solicitations of trust funds from donors by its staff members, indicating that it believes trust funds can (partially) displace core contributions. 3 Reinsberg (2015) discusses implications for the World Bank. Over the last decade, trust funds at the World Bank have proliferated. The total number of active trust funds considered in this paper exceeded 1200, excluding the largely independent financial intermediary funds 4 (FIFs) and trust funds at the International Financial Corporation (IFC). These funds disbursed more than 22.5 billion USD over the fiscal years 2002-2012, our sample period. 5 To put this number into perspective, gross disbursements by IDA, the fund accounting for most concessional lending by the World Bank, amounted to 10.9 billion USD in the 2012 fiscal year. Figure 1 shows the significant increase in trust fund disbursements over the last decade and how its volume compares to IDA funds. Most disbursements were made to specific countries, while smaller shares are allocated to a region or for global goods. Donors are very heterogeneous in their use of trust funds to deliver their foreign aid. In the 2002-2012 sample period, the largest sovereign contributors to World Bank funds, excluding FIFs, were the United Kingdom, the European Commission, the United States, and the Netherlands. 6
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According to the official narrative, trust funds fill 'gaps in the multilateral system' with respect to global public goods and following "emergencies such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and the end of armed conflict, where donors want to coordinate their bilateral aid and where the MDBs do not grant resources to engage on a sufficient scale" (IEG 2011a: 5) . However, a systematic evaluation of the cross-country allocation patterns of trust fund aid is still lacking. In this paper, we focus on the criteria of policy selectivity and poverty selectivity that largely guide IDA allocations, and that reflect a widespread belief about country characteristics conducive to the productive use of aid funds.
Three actors are involved in the recent trust fund trend: donor countries, the World Bank, and recipient countries. Donor governments may use trust funds to target their foreign aid to priority countries and development issues, while, and in contrast to bilateral aid, delegating responsibility for its management and implementation to the multilateral organization. Evidence collected by the Bank's evaluation unit (IEG 2011a) through structured interviews with fifty-five officials of eight donor countries finds that six out of eight donor countries use trust funds to target priority issues or countries. From the perspective of the multilateral organization, trust funds allow expanding its global role and operations, and increasing its staff and assets under management (IEG 2011a: 9) .
From a recipient country perspective, trust funds may have several positive implications.
For middle-income countries seeking technical assistance but are reluctant to borrow for this purpose, trust funds make technical assistance available at grant terms (IEG 2011a: 7) . Trust funds have also supported post-conflict and post-disaster countries and territories that are ineligible to borrow from the IDA or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (e.g., Timor-Leste, Aceh in Indonesia, West Bank and Gaza). Moreover, trust funds have encouraged the provision of global public goods (IEG 2011a: viii) . While multi-donor trust funds could, theoretically, improve donor coordination prior to implementation, reducing excessive and harmful donor fragmentation in the field (Huq 2010 , IEG 2011a , its effects on donor harmonization seem ambiguous (IEG 2011a: 43, Barakat, Rzeszut and Martin 2012: 34f.) as trust funds usually do not replace existing bilateral and multilateral projects (Barakat 2009: 112 ).
An evaluation of World Bank trust funds (IEG 2011a: 7) highlights their importance for countries in arrears or entities, where IDA is legally forbidden to engage and bilateral donors prefer not to engage alone. Looking at aggregate official aid flows, however, it is still unclear whether, and in what sectors or countries, trust fund aid substitutes for (i.e., "crowds out") or complements multilateral or bilateral aid, or if it is additional to traditional aid. Using data on donors organized in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer (2015) find some evidence that earmarked or multi-bi aid is additional to multilateral aid, although their estimations may suffer from potential reverse causality and simultaneity. Also for the World Bank, but based on data only through 2009, Huq (2010) finds that the sectoral allocation of trust funds executed by recipients is "aligned" (or positively correlated) with IDA but not with IBRD disbursements. Donor countries might prefer using trust funds rather than bilateral or multilateral aid for a number of reasons. Donors might seek to supplement IDA funding for particular countries, sectors and/or projects, and trust funds are often used to co-finance IDA projects. In other cases, bilateral donors may use trust funds to complement their bilateral programming when their aid agencies do not have sufficient presence or expertise in countries to implement programs effectively (OECD 2010 (OECD : 40, 2011 . Donor officials state that the proliferation of trust fund aid is associated with a need for a new type of aid that is complementary to the existing multilateral and bilateral aid.
They claim that multilateral core contributions to the World Bank and other MDBs cannot achieve some aims because contributions cannot be earmarked (IEG 2011a Eligibility for IDA funds is based on being under a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) threshold and on a lack of access to non-concessionary lending. Replenishments of IDA, and IDA policies regarding allocations and other issues, are negotiated every third year by donor countries.
Throughout our sample period, IDA resources were allocated according to an explicit rule taking into account recipient need (as measured by low per capita income) and the quality of economic policies and governance, where the latter is assumed to increase aid effectiveness (e.g., Dollar 2000, 2004) . The World Bank's "Country Policy and Institutional Assessments" (CPIA) measure the quality of policies and institutions, and are the most important element in the formula determining allocations for most IDA-eligible countries. 8 The IDA donors, largely working in concert with Bank management and staff, determine the content of the CPIA and its weight in the allocation formula. Morrison (2013) finds that during the cold war IDA-eligible countries received more IDA commitments when they held seats on the World Bank Executive Board. However, he reports that this effect is absent after 1989, when IDA's performance-based allocation system became more formal and transparent, reducing any discretion in the process. He found no support for the hypothesis that the CPIA ratings at the core of this allocation system are influenced by the Bank's shareholders.
Not all donors, however, are equally supportive of current IDA allocation policies. For example, some donor countries have called for increasing the weight accorded to need in the allocation formula, so that countries emerging from conflict may benefit from increasing funding (see Manning 2014) . 9 Such donors might reduce their contributions to IDA and divert them to supporting trust funds that complement IDA funding. While donors could also shift these funds to their respective bilateral aid budgets, they might want some share of it implemented by the Bank.
The IEG (2011a: 6f) evaluation suggests that donors appreciate the World Bank as a trustee because of its capacity, expertise and strong working relations with governments, and reports that five out of eight donors acknowledged using trust funds to influence the World Bank. If trust fund aid is used in this way to complement the (cross-country) allocation of the IDA funds, then trust funds should be more weakly related than IDA to the quality of policies in IDA-eligible recipient countries -and the relationship could even be negative.
Trust funds are often used to respond to natural disasters and other humanitarian crises, and to fund environmental and other projects with significant spillovers across national borders that do not always conform well to IDA's country-based approach. To the extent humanitarian and cross-border problems are not correlated with per capita income and policy quality, allocations of trust funds responding to these problems are likely to be less poverty-and policy-selective than IDA allocations. For several reasons, therefore, trust funds can potentially undermine IDA's "performance-based allocation" (PBA) system intended (1) to direct more aid to countries where its development impact is likely to be greater, and (2) to create incentives for policy improvements in recipient countries. 8 The CPIA measures numerous aspects of policies and institutions, grouped into four "clusters" or broad policy areas: (macro)economic management, structural policies, equity and social inclusion, and public sector management and institution. A detailed description can be found at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1244163232994/6180403-1372096800800/CPIAcriteria2012.pdf. 9 Donor countries can and, surprisingly, do unilaterally increase their IDA contributions beyond what is seen as their fair share (Manning 2014) . These additional contributions do not increase the formal voting power of the donor, although higher voluntary contributions might function as an informal leverage effect for their preferences. It could be that these additional contributions are popular domestically (Milner 2006) . For example, the United Kingdom committed more than the USA to IDA15 and IDA17 replenishments USA (Manning 2014). Our data on disbursements by World Bank trust funds for the 2002-2012 period allow us to study whether and how trust fund aid is allocated differently from bilateral and multilateral aid, particularly with respect to policy-and poverty-selectivity. We analyze trust fund disbursements using linear regression models that account for time-invariant effects. Because motives are likely to vary with the type of trust funds , we consider single-donor and recipientexecuted trust funds separately, as types where an individual donor has the greatest control over where and how the funds are used. We also run separate tests for three sectors in which trust funds are relatively popular with donors -health, education, and environment -and where the CPIA includes specific measures of the quality of sectoral policies.
Several studies (e.g., Annen and Knack 2015; Dollar and Levin 2006) have shown that IDA disbursements are highly responsive to per capita income and to the quality of policies, as intended by the IDA performance-based allocation system. Specifically, they show that disbursements increase with the quality of policy controlling for per capita income (and population), and that they decrease with per capita income, controlling for the quality of policy (and population). Aid from some bilateral donors is also very poverty-and/or policy selective, but bilateral aid overall is much less selective than multilateral aid, and IDA is more selective than aid from most other multilaterals (Knack et al. 2011; Dollar and Levin 2006) . Although multilaterals' Very few analyses have been done of the selectivity of World Bank trust funds. World Bank (2007) reported that "the distribution of IDA disbursements" among IDA-eligible countries does not follow a discernible performance-based or needs-based pattern. In fact, it found a negative correlation with CPIA ratings. However, that report did not explain its methodology: e.g., it is not clear whether it controlled for per capita income in testing the relationship of trust fund disbursements with CPIA ratings. A few years later, another World Bank study (Huq 2010) reported a positive but not very strong correlation between commitments per capita from recipient-executed trust funds (RETF) and the CPIA ratings, which assess recipients' policy performance and institutional capacity.
Finally, an evaluation of the World Bank's implementation of its 2007 Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy reports a positive coefficient on the CPIA rating in RETF allocation regressions. However, this positive coefficient is insignificant for RETF disbursements and only marginally significant for RETF commitments (IEG 2011b) . When the sample is limited to IDA-eligible countries, CPIA is not significant even for RETF commitments. The analysis is limited to the years 2004-2010, and it uses only one of the four "clusters" (on public sector management and institutions) of policy areas in the CPIA.
Theoretical considerations
The World Bank allocates IDA funds among eligible recipients mainly based on its CPIA index that measures recipients' policy performance and institutional capacity, 10 and on per capita income. This reliance on the CPIA index reflects donors' view that resources are more likely to be used productively in countries with favorable policies and strong public management systems (e.g., Dollar 2000, 2004 When we focus on all recipient countries, we include a dummy for effective IDA eligibility.
The dummy for effective IDA eligibility might influence the probability and size of trust fund resources with a sign that could go in either direction. On the one hand, IDA recipients might be less likely than IBRD countries or non-member states and territories to receive trust fund aid because they already benefit from IDA resources. On the other hand, bilateral donors might view IDA countries as those countries in particular need of additional resources (Knack et al. 2014 ) and where the Bank has an advantage in expertise, and thus channel more of their "bilateral" aid to those countries through the Bank in the form of trust funds. In many cases, trust funds are even used to "co-finance" IDA projects. If such cases are very common, trust fund aid should be positively correlated with the IDA dummy, or with net IDA flows, which we control for in some regressions.
We also control for other donor motives in establishing World Bank-managed trust funds.
Bilateral donors state that they use trust funds to complement their bilateral programming when their aid agencies do not have sufficient presence or expertise in countries to implement programs effectively (OECD 2010 (OECD : 40, 2011 , and appreciate the World Bank as a trustee because of its capacity, expertise and strong working relations with governments (IEG 2011a: 6f Donors also use trust funds to fill "gaps in the multilateral system," in particular to provide a rapid response to "emergencies such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and the end of armed conflict, where donors want to coordinate their bilateral aid and where the MDBs do not grant resources to engage on a sufficient scale" (IEG 2011a: 5) . We test these motives by including dummy variables for disaster-affected, post-conflict, and fragile states.
Given the multitude of motives for using trust funds, we use multivariate statistical analysis that allows assessing the relative importance of these simultaneous motives while keeping unobserved time-invariant characteristics and year-specific shocks constant.
Data
Our dependent variable is (logged) disbursements of trust funds to recipient countries based on the financial accounting tables of the World Bank. 13 In the disbursements data, recipient countries are almost always indicated but donors are unknown, so that we cannot discriminate 12 A small number of post-conflict countries receive supplemental IDA funding for a limited number of years. 13 We use the data from as obtained from the Bank's CFGP.
between the sources of funds. 14 The unit of analysis is the recipient country-year, rather than donor-recipient-year. For purposes of comparing the overall aid selectivity of World Bank trust funds to IDA and to other bilateral aid, this is the appropriate unit of analysis, because it implicitly weights larger trust fund donors more heavily in the analysis. With donor-recipient-year observations, each donor-recipient pair would receive an equal weight. If selectivity of trust fund aid differed systematically for large and small donors, selectivity coefficients could be a misleading indicator of overall selectivity.
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The structure of the disbursements data is depicted in Figure 2 
Figures 3 and 4 approximately here
In testing for poverty-and policy-selectivity of trust funds and other aid, we control for log of population. The IDA allocation formula provides more aid to larger countries, but with an elasticity of less than one. Studies typically show a "small country bias" for IDA disbursementsi.e. aid increases less than proportionately with population -but this bias is smaller than for aid from most other donors (e.g. Annen and Knack 2015) . Due to missing and low-quality data on actual poverty rates (e.g. % of the population living on less than $2 per day), GNI per capita (Atlas method) is used as a proxy for poverty in the IDA formula. Results are robust to substituting GDP per capita (PPP), which is used more commonly in the aid allocation literature. 16 All three variables come from the World Development Indicators.
Aggregated and partially-disaggregated CPIA scores for IDA-eligible countries are publicly available from the World Development Indicators (WDI) since 2005, and range from a minimum 14 The by far most important contributors to trust funds are DAC countries, accounting for eighty percent of contributions over the period of study. Non-DAC donor countries, private companies, NGOs and multilateral organizations are relatively minor contributors (see also Eichenauer 2015) . 15 Our dataset does not contain the information on country allocation by FIFs, which have their own governance and disbursement systems (see . 16 Results are available from the authors upon request.
score of 1 (lowest quality policies) to a maximum of 6 (highest quality where the dummy equals one in those country-years in which a country was on the official lists of fragile situations. 17 We create a separate dummy for countries eligible for special "post-conflict" funding (World Bank 2014b). We control for (logged) bilateral aid and development aid received from official donors through channels other than trust funds and IDA using OECD/DAC data (2015) and World Bank data for (logged) IDA flows.
In robustness tests, we control for several donor-interest variables, following the literature on allocation of bilateral aid (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000) . First, we measure geopolitical interests by the alignment of votes between recipient and donors in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) using data from Strezhnev and Voeten (2009) . Annual measures of voting alignment range from 0 to 1 with higher values implying higher similarity and are calculated as in Kilby (2013) using all UN votes. We calculate the mean alignment of the largest three sovereign trust fund donors, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands, which we label as "the G3." 18 We exclude the European Commission, the second largest donor, because its preference aggregation process is more complex (Reinsberg et al. 2014 ). Second, we add a dummy for a colonial relationship between a G3 donor and the recipient country. Third, commercial interests are measured by total G3 exports, using data from the IMF (2015). A thorough test of the importance of these variables in aid allocation decisions would require a different dataset, with donor-recipient-year observations. In our analysis, we merely use these as control variables. and IDA-eligible countries 65%, of observations.
Estimation Method and main results
This section tests the selectivity of trust fund aid, compared to IDA and bilateral aid. We use panel models with random and fixed effects without a selection stage, because almost all recipient countries receive positive trust fund disbursements at least once during our sample period. Our sample includes all recipient countries that the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) considered developing countries in a given year.
As is common in the aid allocation literature, our baseline regression model looks as follows:
ln(disbursements)i,t = α + β CPIAi,t-1 + γ ln(populationi,t-1) + δ ln(GNI p.C.i,t-1) + λ'Xi,t-k + αi + σt + εi,t
where i refers to the recipient country and t to the Bank's fiscal year. Errors εi,t are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the recipient level and we include time-fixed effects σt and recipient-fixed effects αi. Table 3 shows results with recipient-and year-fixed effects for all IDA countries (columns 1-3) and all developing countries (columns 4-6). Trust funds and IDA provide significantly higher aid to poorer and better-governed (i.e. higher CPIA) countries (columns 3 and 1 respectively).
Trust fund allocations are thus much more similar to IDA than to other ODA in terms of poverty and policy selectivity. 21 Coefficients on (log of) GNI per capita (and on log of population) are interpretable as elasticities, so a 1% increase in per capita GNI reduces IDA flows by 1.9% (column 1) and TF aid by 2.6% (column 3). A 1-point increase in the CPIA rating (measured on a 1 to 6 scale) is associated with a nearly 20-fold increase in IDA flows ( = e 3.031 -1) and 7-fold increase in TF aid ( = e 2.101 -1). Note, however, that a 1-point increase in CPIA is very large in relative terms, equal to nearly two standard deviations.
Even for a sample that includes non-IDA countries (column 6), trust funds are very policy selective as well as poverty selective. This holds true in regressions with random effects that allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables, as shown in Table 4 . The main difference is that the estimated effects of country size are more consistent and significant. The coefficients on population for other aid types in Table 4 reflects the bias in favor of small-countries (in per capita terms) frequently noted in the literature, but this bias is nearly absent for trust fund aid, where the coefficient on population is almost one (see Fleck and Kilby 2010) . When we include a dummy for fragile countries and limit the sample to the post-2005 years accordingly, we do not find that these countries receive more trust fund aid (Table 5 , column 2). Moreover, the inclusion of this dummy has only trivial effects on coefficients for the selectivity variables (comparing columns 1 and 2).
Potentially, allocating aid partly for commercial and political motives could weaken the policy-and poverty-selectivity of trust funds. If so, then when we control for those factors the absolute value of the selectivity coefficients should increase, i.e. "conditional" selectivity should be stronger than "unconditional" selectivity. We include measures for commercial and political motives in Table 5 (column 3), but find the coefficients on the selectivity variables to change little compared to Table 3 (column 6). The commercial and political variables -UNGA voting alignment with the G3, and total G3 exports -are significant, with the expected positive signs. In column 4 of Table 5 we use random effects instead of fixed effects, so are able to add a second political interest variable, a dummy for former colonies of G3 donors. The colonial heritage dummy is not significant and its inclusion again has only trivial effects on the selectivity coefficients (comparing Table 5 , column 4 and Table 4 , column 6). The last column in Table 5 Donor countries might prefer RETFs, which are under more direct control of donors, over trust funds more generally. In particular, some BETF allocations by country are determined by staff. Therefore, RETFs could be less poverty-and policy-selective, and guided by political and commercial objective to a larger extent. Column 2 of Table 6 replicates the method and specification of Table 5 , column 3, but for RETFs instead of for all TFs. In this fixed effects test, GNI per capita is not significant, and its coefficient is reduced somewhat in absolute value compared to the case of all TFs. The political and commercial variables also are not significant. In a random effects test, however, per capita income is highly significant, and political alignment is associated with significantly larger RETF allocations (Table 6 , column 4). Comparing column 1 to column 2, 22 For the IDA sample, IDA flows are significant in the fixed and random effects models.
and column 3 to column 4, in Table 6 we see that results for the selectivity variables are once more affected very little by controlling for political and commercial interests.
Single-donor trust funds could also be used by donors to support strategic interests, while multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) should look more like IDA: other things equal, as an MDTF includes more donors, it will look more like the full set of IDA donors. Compared to an SDTF donor, donors in MDTFs should therefore have a stronger collective interest in selectivity, and in limiting the role of political and commercial factors in determining aid allocations. Columns 5-8 of Table 6 replicate columns 1-4, but for SDTFs instead of RETFs. We find some support for the hypothesis that political interests matter more for SDTFs, as coefficients on voting alignment are somewhat larger in columns 6 and 8 than in columns 3 and 4, respectively, of Table 5 . These coefficients are not significantly larger, however, and selectivity for policy and poverty are still strong. Table 7 tests whether donors use trust funds to provide extra funding for post-conflict and disaster-affected countries in a coordinated manner. We find no evidence that these motives explain trust fund allocations: neither a post-conflict dummy variable nor a measure of the number of people affected by a disaster is significantly related to TF aid.
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In Table 8 , we disaggregate the data to analyze three specific sectors -education, health, and environment -that are popular among trust fund donors ( Figure 5 ), and for which sectorspecific indicators of the quality of policies (CPIA sub-ratings) are produced. For this analysis, we use the relevant sector-specific IDA disbursements, as well as the sector-specific CPIA sub-ratings.
Most projects in the sample have objectives in multiple sectors, and we assign projects to the sector which has the largest sectoral share. We focus on the two sectors for which we have a respective CPIA sub-score, namely education and health. For environment, we use the theme code and the corresponding CPIA rating. 23 We find health and education aid to be poverty and policy selective in random effects regressions (Table 8 , columns 1 and 3). While education aid is responsive also to policy improvements over time within countries (column 2), health aid is not (column 4). In contrast, environmental aid is responsive neither to policy improvements over time within countries (i.e., in the fixed effects regression reported in column 6 nor between countries (column 5). In sum, we find consistent evidence that cross-country allocation of aggregate trust fund aid is poverty and policy selective and allocated more similarly to IDA than to other aid.
Conclusion
This paper is the first to analyze the cross-country allocation of trust funds, a relatively new aid channel that can be described as a hybrid between bilateral and multilateral aid. Donor rhetoric suggests that some World Bank-administered trust funds are intended to support countries neglected by IDA for legal, political, and other reasons. Potentially, therefore, the cross-country allocation of these trust funds may compensate for the performance-based allocation of IDA funds, "diluting" the poverty-and policy-selectivity of total World Bank-administered aid. We test whether donors' allocations of trust funds tend to favor recipients with lower per capita incomes and more favorable policy environments, as measured by the Bank's CPIA. Results show that World Bank trust fund allocations are similar to IDA, and dissimilar to other bilateral aid (summed over all DAC donors) in terms of their policy-and poverty-selectivity.
The allocation of recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds, which are under closer control of donor countries, appears to be more strongly motivated by strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. However, a more complete investigation of the role of donor interest variables would require a different dataset and different unit of analysis (donorrecipient pairs) than we use in this paper. 24 We also explore trust fund disbursements for three specific sectors, and find evidence that health and education aid, but not environmental aid, are Finally, as experience with trust fund aid accumulates, another important research question will be its effectiveness, relative to core multilateral and traditional bilateral aid, in contributing to growth and human development outcomes.
24 Factors related to donors' and recipients' domestic political economies are investigated by Dietrich (forthcoming) and Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2016) . 25 One review of World Bank non-lending technical assistance projects rated the quality of fully-trust funded projects lower than projects that were wholly or partially Bank-financed, and concluded that the difference was attributable in part to less attention by management and staff to trust funded projects (see IEG 2011a: ch. 3). 
